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“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”
(Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Proposition 5.6.)
1 Short review
Quantum mechanics faces a strange dilemma. On the one hand it has long
been claimed to be an irreducibly statistical theory, allowing the calculation of
measurement outcome statistics while being unable to predict the behaviour
of individual microphysical processes. On the other hand, quantum mechan-
ics has been increasingly used, with stunning success in the past few decades,
to gain experimental control over individual objects on an atomic scale. The
old philosophical debates among physicists over the interpretation of quantum
mechanics have thus reached a new stage where conceptual questions have ob-
tained more precise formulations and former Gedanken experiments have been
turned into actual experiments. This situation has given an enormous boost
to research into the foundations of quantum mechanics, leading to a variety of
promising approaches towards a satisfactory theoretical account of individual
microphysical phenomena. It is not clear at present whether such an account
requires a modification of the standard quantum formalism or whether it can be
achieved within that formalism, on the basis of a consistent realist, individual
interpretation.
D. Home’s book is devoted to contributing towards a clarification of this
question. It is evidently written by an inspired and established participant in
the ongoing quest to understand quantum mechanics and its description of the
physical world. The author openly admits to his own, Bohmian ontological,
preference; but in no place does the book become dogmatic about this although
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that preference determines the line of.reasoning through most chapters. It rather
adheres to its motto, expressed beautifully in the following quotations, chosen
as the opening and closing words: ‘It is the customary fate of new truths to
begin as heresies and to end as superstitions’ (p.ix), and: ‘The point is not to
pocket the truth but to chase it’ (p. 378) The aim of the book is ‘to provide
an overview of the present status of the foundational issues of nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics. ... The need to go beyond the standard interpretation is
a focal point of the book’ (p. x). The book recommends itself, appropriately,
as just that: an overview of conceptual issues in quantum mechanics, from a
physicist’s perspective. The physical jargon and the style of presentation of
mathematics are those of a practising theoretical physicist; this will come easily
to fellow physicists but may in places provide difficulties for philosophers or
mathematically inclined readers.
The book focuses ‘firmly on the conceptual aspects, details of an experi-
mental or mathematical nature have been minimized wherever possible.’ With
foundations of quantum physics being a substantial interdisciplinary research
field in its own right, it is impossible to give a comprehensive account in one
single book; hence any author is bound and justified to make a choice of topics
in accordance with his or her own expertise and preference. Home’s choice of
perspective is that of a critical comparison mainly of three modern approaches
to solve central conceptual problems of quantum mechanics – the Bohmian
causal approach, the decoherence models, and the spontaneous wave function
collapse models. A distinguishing feature of the book is that this comparison is
not so much concerned with the relative theoretical or philosophical merits and
difficulties faced by these approaches, but that it focuses strongly on possible
experimental discriminations between them, taking into account modern tech-
nological advances. Home’s choice of topics (each one assigned a chapter) gives
a fair reflection of the core of current interest in foundational issues of quan-
tum mechanics: a review of the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation and the
need to go beyond it; the quantum measurement paradox; the classical limit of
quantum mechanics; quantum nonlocality; wave particle duality; quantum Zeno
effect; causality in quantum mechanics; and a reappraisal of Einstein’s critique
of quantum mechanics. Each chapter starts with a superb nontechnical, deeply
reflected introduction of its topic, continues with a lot of detailed, careful phys-
ical discussion, and concludes with an extensive, valuable bibliography. Home
has done a good job in trying to make up for omissions by adding further rele-
vant references. Overall, a list of more than 700 works is provided, albeit quite
strictly chosen within the confines of the book’s specific outlook. The index is
arranged purely by authors; a separate subject index would have been helpful
in view of the size of this volume.
The production quality of the book is acceptable, except for the display
of mathematical formulas; these look very much as if they were produced by
typewriters, and long formulas are especially hard to read. In addition, care-
ful proofreading could have helped to avoid a number of misprints in the text
and formulas. A curious example: on page 23, ‘...g (t) is switched on and off
successfully...’ rather than ‘successively’; and on page 247: ‘particle ontogo-
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nal approach’ instead of ‘particle ontological approach’. (Also, after several
months of repeated study, the glue binding gave in, leaving me with two loosely
connected parts of the book in my hands.)
Overall, I would recommend this book as a very valuable, up-to-date account
of quantum foundations from the perspective of a physicist interested in possible
experimental tests. It certainly provides a good graduate text for students of
physics seeking a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics, as well as being
a useful resource for researchers in the foundations and philosophy of modern
physics. The book complements in an original way related recent publications
on the foundations of quantum mechanics, such as the texts on “Bohmian”
quantum mechanics by D. Bohm and B. Hiley (1993) and P. Holland (1993), or
the “strictly instrumentalist” Quantum Theory text by A. Peres (Peres, 1993).
Readers keen to get to know the book may stop reading here and return,
if they wish, to this review at a later stage. In the subsequent, more detailed
survey of the contents, I will point to some related lines of research concerned
with structural aspects of quantum mechanics which are not addressed in this
book but awareness of which I believe is crucial for obtaining a wider perspective
on some problems. This attempt to place the present book in a broader context
is meant to illustrate the fact that in the study of the foundations of quantum
physics we seem to be facing a diversity of research cultures which may benefit
considerably from each other if they could be brought into closer communication.
It is only fair to note that this point could be made with reference to any one of
the books on foundations of quantum mechanics, so that my remarks should not
be understood as criticisms of this particular book but rather as an illustration
of the general situation within this community.
It goes without saying that the choice of comments and issues raised is
again limited by a particular perspective, this time the reviewer’s. If Home’s
perspective is that of a theoretical physicist with a detailed knowledge of the
experimental side and a remarkable openness towards the philosophical side,
then I might characterise my own outlook as that of someone trained as a theo-
retical physicist who ended up working ‘somewhere’ between theoretical physics
and mathematical physics, while both of us seem driven by an understand-
ing of physics as natural philosophy, or experimental metaphysics. To obtain a
balanced overview of the foundations of quantum physics, it would indeed be
desirable to complement and confront the views presented in the book and in
this review with those of a true philosopher of physics, a professional mathe-
matical physicist, and a real experimental physicist. For the time being, with
a symposium of that kind outstanding for an indeterminate amount of time,
I suggest that my deliberations be accepted as one reader’s dialogue with this
book.
2 Ontological position vs ontic indeterminacy
Chapter 1 starts with a brief outline of the quantum formalism and its stan-
dard interpretation. Home uses this term to refer to what he describes as the
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common hypothesis of all versions of the so-called orthodox, or Copenhagen in-
terpretation: the hypothesis that a ‘wave function is considered to be a complete
description of the quantum mechanical state of either an individual system or
an ensemble of identically prepared systems’ (p. 16). The completeness claim,
according to Home, ‘immediately implies accepting an inherently statistical de-
scription in the microphysical domain.’ In the standard interpretation, the
“wave function”1 is a representation of all probabilistic knowledge about out-
comes of possible measurements and as such is devoid of any ontological content:
‘In other words in the standard interpretation, the formalism of quantum me-
chanics or the quantum algorithm does not reflect a well-defined underlying
reality, but rather it constitutes only knowledge about the statistics of observed
results’ (p. 17). Accordingly, Home rejects Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s interpreta-
tions of the uncertainty relations to the extent that they go beyond the direct
experimental meaning in terms of spreads of measurement statistics: it cannot
be logically inferred from the uncertainty relation that individual atomic par-
ticles could not have possessed simultaneous definite values for noncommuting
variables before any measurement.
These observations are made to indicate that there is scope for alternative
interpretations of quantum mechanics which provide more of a realist account
of phenomena in the domain of that theory. To substantiate this claim, Home
reviews Bell’s critical analysis of von Neumann’s influential no-hidden-variables
theorem as well as the Kochen-Specker theorem, to point out the possibility of
contextual hidden variables. The need to go beyond standard quantum me-
chanics derives from the infamous quantum measurement problem, the classical
limit puzzle, and the phenomenon of nonlocality, issues to which the next three
chapters are devoted.
Among the standard interpretations, Home distinguishes those which re-
gard the state vector either as a representation of an ensemble (of identically
prepared systems) or of an individual system. It is the latter which needs to be
contrasted with the realist interpretations. It is well known that an unknown
quantum state cannot be uniquely determined in a single run of a measurement,
and a simple argument is presented showing that any attempt to nevertheless
achieve this by means of state cloning must fail. However, Home sketches an
interesting proposal by Aharonov and Vaidman, known as protective measure-
ment, according to which the direct measurement of a state on a single system is
possible provided enough is known about that state so as to ensure that the state
change due to the measurement is negligible. This would indeed demonstrate
that some objective reality can be ascribed to the quantum state. In the sim-
plest possible case, the proposal would reduce to the situation where the state
ϕ is known and a von Neumann-Lu˝ders measurement of a simple observable,
with outcomes represented by the projections Pϕ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ|, I − Pϕ, would lead
with certainty to the result indicating ϕ. However, the protective measurement
idea refers to situations where the state need not be known in full, while at the
1I use ‘wave functions’ in quotation marks in order to indicate that I regard it as part of
an outdated terminology. The term ‘state (vector)’ would suggest itself as a more neutral
expression that does not carry the connotation of a classical wave ontology.
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same time the known puzzles of individual state determinations are claimed to
be avoided. As Home makes repeated reference to protective measurements,
it seems worthwhile to point out a potential weakness of the existing propos-
als that may restrict the validity of some of the implications suggested in the
literature.
The core feature of the various proposed schemes of protective measure-
ments is that for some quantum states, ϕ, (known to belong to a certain class
determined by the measurement interaction applied) it is possible to obtain as
a single reading the expectation value, 〈ϕ|Aϕ〉, of some observable A, without
significantly changing the state. If such a protective measurement is carried out
for a sufficiently large set of (noncommuting) observables A,B,C, . . . , then the
values obtained may suffice to infer what the state was – and the system would
still be in that state. However, in these protective measurement schemes, no
analysis has been made of the magnitude of inference errors involved: it is only
shown that the expected outcome is 〈ϕ|Aϕ〉, but no estimate of a range of uncer-
tainty has been given. In fact, in a model of a joint measurement of position Q
and momentum P very similar to one of the protective measurement schemes, it
has been shown that the realisation of the protective conditions entails that the
likely error range for the joint values 〈ϕ|Pϕ〉, 〈ϕ|Qϕ〉 is large compared to the
corresponding variances of momentum and position in the state ϕ, respectively;
hence a unique state inference is impossible (Busch, 1985; Busch et al, 1995,
Sec. VI.3.2). It may be worth noting that the idea of measuring the expec-
tation value of an observable on a single system was considered and critically
examined in a rigorous spin chain measurement model as early as 1978 (Zapp,
1978).
Whatever the value of protective measurements may ultimately turn out to
be, from a conceptual point of view the existence of von Neumann-Lu˝ders mea-
surements of a discrete observable is sufficient to warrant the objective reality of
a pure quantum state as explained above. Apart from answering the question of
the epistemological or ontological status of the quantum state, any interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics will provide some rules which determine the actual
properties of a system in a given state. Home proceeds with an outline of the
Bohmian ontological model, the best (if not the only) elaborated nonstandard
interpretation. In contrast to the standard interpretations, the Bohmian model
ascribes reality to a particular physical quantity, the particle’s position, in ad-
dition to the “wave function”. Home argues in several places throughout the
book for the necessity of distinguishing the kind of reality possessed by position
from the kind of reality possessed by the wave function: position is what we
as observers discern most directly, while the “wave function” makes itself felt
rather more indirectly, in its role as “pilot wave” guiding the particle’s motion.
The ontological priority of position over the “wave function” must be assumed,
according to Home, if the Bohmian model is to address adequately the measure-
ment problem and the classical limit problem. In line with this claim, Home
maintains that since within the standard approaches the “wave function” has
a solely epistemic – probabilistic – function, it cannot provide an appropriate
account of the emergence of a definite, ontic (pointer) position of a macroscopic
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object as we know it within the realm of classical physics.
However, the examples with which Home tries to illustrate the possible supe-
riority of the Bohmian over the standard interpretation are not entirely conclu-
sive (as he concedes). It is quite evident that the Bohm model allows one easily
to formalise barrier transmission and reflection times, or to describe elementary
particle trajectories as they are assumed in the theoretical deduction of CP vio-
lation in kaon decay. Such concepts are notoriously difficult to incorporate into
quantum mechanics. Yet, a thorough analysis of these experimental situations
within standard quantum mechanics is still lacking, and so it cannot be ruled
out that a satisfactory and rigorous account will finally be found. As recent
studies seem to indicate, the relevant tools are just about to be recognised: a
formal representation of time observables and particle trajectories within quan-
tum mechanics can indeed be given, namely in terms of positive operator valued
measures (a.k.a. POVMs) (see, e.g., Muga et al, 2000). The uninitiated reader
may find an elementary introduction in the recent review of the monograph of
Busch et al (1995) by Fleming (2000).
The description of quantum observables as POVMs can be seen as a comple-
tion of the notion of observable within the Hilbert space framework of quantum
mechanics, just as the description of quantum states as density operators con-
stitutes a completion of the concept of states. In the latter case, the state
vectors represent the set of pure states, the extremal elements of the full convex
set of states, while in the former case, the traditional concept of observables is
included in the form of projection valued measures (PVMs). It is quite conceiv-
able that the extended (still standard) quantum language, which comprises all
effects2, whether projections or not, can be given a consistent realist interpre-
tation of states and properties that incorporates ontic indeterminacy. Rather
than following Home’s interpretation of Heisenberg’s potentiality concept in an
epistemic sense, one may try to understand the tendency to actualisation in
an ontic sense. That is to say, it may be possible to interpret the expression
tr [ρ ·E], which is usually taken to be the probability for the occurrence of the
outcome associated with the effect E if measured on a state ρ, as a measure of
the degree of actualisation of the (sharp or unsharp) property represented by
E.
It is probably true that the feasibility of such an individual, unsharp (or
fuzzy) reality interpretation of quantum indeterminacy has not been sufficiently
explored. But it seems to me that Home’s argument that the inference from the
uncertainty relation to the ontological indeterminateness of position and mo-
mentum, say, is not logically compelling has a counterpart aimed at a Bohmian
interpretation of position as a definite property: Bohm’s hidden variable theory
is contextual in the sense that the measured values of (most) observables are
2I use this word in italic letters, to emphasise that it is a technical term. In a measurement
scheme, every outcome is represented by an effect, which is determined as the unique operator
whose expectation in each state gives the probability of that outcome. Technically effects are
positive operators bounded between the zero and identity operators O and I. Operators E,F
are ordered as E ≤ F iff 〈ϕ|Eϕ〉 ≤ 〈ϕ|Eϕ〉 for all vectors ϕ ∈ H. An operator E is bounded
between O and I iff O ≤ E ≤ I.
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bound to differ from the possessed premeasurement values of the corresponding
physical quantities. Hence there is no compelling reason to assume that posi-
tions have definite values; and one may wonder what is gained by telling stories
about a physical system if what the stories tell is beyond experimental control.
One may add that the standard use of quantum mechanics alone, without any
recourse to hidden variables, has resulted in highly sophisticated technologies
enabling the control of and experimentation with single micro-objects.
In discussing the interpretation of the uncertainty relations, Home points
out rightly that the variances of position and momentum in a quantum state
bear no logical connection with the measurement errors occurring in simultane-
ous measurements of these quantities. Such a connection seems to be suggested
by Heisenberg in various semi-classical Gedanken experiments. A clarification
of the question as to whether a measurement uncertainty relation holds nec-
essarily for position and momentum had long been hampered due to the fact
that no formal conception of joint measurements for noncommuting quantities
was available. However, there do exist formal schemes for approximate mea-
surements of position and momentum, and if the corresponding measurement
couplings between the object system and two probes are activated simultane-
ously, then the resulting measurement scheme does constitute a joint approxi-
mate measurement of position and momentum; and it turns out that however
small the position and momentum imprecisions are when the measurements are
applied separately, the joint coupling of both probes results in a readjustment
of the individual measurement imprecisions in such a way that they satisfy an
uncertainty relation. Furthermore, it follows within these models that upon ob-
taining a phase space ‘point’ reading, (x, p), the quantum particle will be found
afterwards in a state in which position and momentum are unsharply localised
at that point, in the sense that the centers and variances of its position and
momentum wave packets are equal to the values x, p, and the measurement
imprecisions δx, δp, respectively. Details of this rigorous ‘measurement impreci-
sion’ version of an uncertainty relation can be found in Sec. VI. of (Busch et al,
1995), where it is also shown that a convenient description of the measured joint
position-momentum observable can be given in terms of POVMs on phase space
in such a way that the measurement imprecision relation is automatically built
in. The above (tentative) indeterminacy interpretation of quantum uncertain-
ties is thus found to establish consistency between the possibilities of definition
(preparation of position and momentum values) and the possibilities of determi-
nation (joint measurement of these quantities): what cannot be prepared better
than allowed by the preparation uncertainty relation cannot be measured more
precisely than allowed by the measurement imprecision relation.
These considerations are intended to show that the development of a mathe-
matical theory of measurement and of observables represented as POVMs, that
took place alongside, and largely unnoticed by, mainstream theoretical physi-
cists, has opened up wider perspectives on some long-standing conceptual is-
sues and offered new possibilities of dealing with them. In particular there is
a well-developed theory of approximate joint measurements of noncommuting
quantities which permits the analysis and interpretation of a variety of modern
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quantum optical and atomic interferometric experiments and also guides the
inception of new experiments. Some important relevant contributions empha-
sising conceptual issues are (de Muynck and Martens, 1990), (Appleby, 1998);
for a more extensive bibliography, cf. (Busch et al, 1995).
While Home has demonstrated nicely in Chapter 1 that there is scope for
going beyond the standard interpretation, the points raised above seem to show
that this may even be true in a sense not anticipated in the present book. Besides
the attempts to restore elements of a classical physical ontology along the lines
of the Bohmian model, there is, I believe, the option of trying to develop a
coherent ‘quantum ontology’; an emphatic advocate of this route and of the
ensuing need to develop and train appropriate quantum intuitions and ways
of thinking is J.-M. Le´vy-Leblond whose pleas for a progressive approach in
incorporating novel theoretical physical structures into our thinking about the
world are as mind-refreshing to read now as they were when they appeared (e.g.,
Le´vy-Leblond, 1974, Le´vy-Leblond, 1981; Le´vy-Leblond and Balibar, 1990). I
agree with Home when he says that any approach will need to be tested against
its merits in dealing with the fundamental conceptual problems of quantum
mechanics. In Chapter 2 he turns to the ‘central riddle’ of quantum mechanics:
the quantum measurement paradox.
3 What is a measurement?
In a quantum mechanical account of measurement processes, the object sys-
tem is brought into an interaction with an apparatus (or probe system) which
establishes an entangled state for the compound system. Thus, the notion of
a non-invasive measurement known from the realm of classical physics is no
longer an admissible idealisation in quantum physics. Starting with this gen-
eral observation, Home proceeds to sketch a variety of simple models in which
the entanglement is shown to arise as a necessary consequence of the minimal
requirement of a measurement to exhibit the eigenstates of the measured ob-
servable. There is no general reflection on the meaning of ‘measurement’ in view
of the fact that a quantum measuring process cannot be said to reveal what is
the case before the measurement, that is, to exhibit the premeasurement value.
(A discussion of this point can be found in (Busch et al, 1991).) Hence we
will adopt the minimal criterion suggested in Home’s models, namely, that a
measurement should exhibit with certainty which eigenstate the system was in,
provided it was prepared in some eigenstate. We may refer to this requirement
as the calibration condition. The linearity of quantum dynamics then leads
to the result that for a superposition of eigenstates, the final state of system
plus probe is a superposition of product states corresponding to different pointer
states. Hence standard quantum mechanics does not seem to yield an account of
the occurrence of a definite outcome, represented by the apparatus being found
in one particular pointer state. This is the fundamental quantum measurement
paradox. Home immediately flags two important related problems, namely, the
question of the preferred pointer basis and the problem of explaining the ob-
8
jective reality of outcomes in terms of changes of properties of the macroscopic
measuring device. The former is addressed by the decoherence theory, while the
latter leads up to the classical limit problem treated in Chapter 3.
At this point it may be noted that the measurement paradox persists in the
case of measurements described by POVMs (Busch and Shimony, 1996). While
it can be expected that POVMs play a crucial ro´le in the description of macro-
scopic observables, there are indications that the conflict between the unitary
quantum dynamics and the occurrence of definite outcomes will not disappear
even if pointer observables are considered as unsharp quantities (Busch, 1998,
Del Seta, 1998).
Interestingly, Home’s first example of a measurement coupling is one that is
purported to measure a continuous quantity, the position of a particle, where the
calibration condition can be satisfied only approximately. This type of model
is taken from von Neumann’s book, and in the history of quantum mechanics
it has found applications in manifold variations. One may therefore refer to
it as the standard model of quantum measurement theory (Busch and Lahti,
1996). The essence of the model is that the initial product of object state
(position amplitude ψ(x)) and probe state (φ0(y)) is unitarily transformed into
a correlated state,
Ψ0(x, y) = ψ(x)φ0(y) −→ Ψ(x, y) = ψ(x)φ0(y − x).
[Note: the summation sign in equation (2.1.12), p. 70 of the book under review,
should be removed.] If the probe amplitude is sharply peaked at y = 0 initially,
and if the object amplitude is sharply peaked at x0, then the final probe am-
plitude will be sharply peaked at y = x0. This is the approximate realisation
of the calibration condition. It may be noted that the probability of finding
the probe in some interval can be expressed as the expectation value of some
positive operator in the initial object state. This operator is a kind of smeared
version of a position spectral projection, and the family of all these operators
associated with the various subsets of position space constitutes a POVM, rep-
resenting the smeared position observable measured by this interaction. It is a
bit ironic that the first-ever and fairly realistic measurement-theoretic model of
a measurement is presented in the same book – von Neumann’s! – that intro-
duces the highly influential, and highly idealised notion of a perfect, repeatable
measurement (of a discrete observable). The latter concept has in fact had a
damaging effect in that it was long considered almost as synonymous with the
term ‘measurement’, while the former model could have instantly led to the
generalised notion of an observable represented as a POVM and opened up a
realistic approach to quantum measurement. For example, as shown in (Busch
and Lahti, 1996), this model lends itself most naturally to the development of
a theory of joint position-momentum measurements, with the ensuing justifi-
cation of the interpretation of the uncertainty relation in terms of individual
measurement imprecision sketched in the preceding section.
The remaining part of Chapter 2 has three parts: a discussion of various
standard solutions and their inadequacies, a review of nonstandard approaches,
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and a section offering some original experimental examples devised to probe the
relative merits of the nonstandard approaches. Among the standard solutions,
Home distinguishes the viewpoints of Bohr and Heisenberg, the decoherence
theory, and the Dirac-von Neumann projection postulate. A common aspect of
these approaches is the (implicit or explicit) reference to the fact that the sys-
tem (plus apparatus) is ultimately left in a mixture of states corresponding to
the relevant pointer states. Indeed, Bohr’s insistence on the need for a classical
description of the measuring devices may be read as an anticipation of the ne-
cessity to explain that superpositions of macrosopically distinct (pointer) states
are practically never observed. Also, Heisenberg’s notion of the (necessary) ‘cut’
between object and device (observer) seems to allow a formalisation in terms
of the partial trace operation over the device Hilbert space, which leaves the
system in a mixed state; the mobility of the location of the cut allows one to
perform the partial trace over the rest of the world beyond the device, which
leaves the system plus device in a mixed state. The quotations given by Home
make it apparent that Heisenberg considered these reduced density operators
to practically admit a subjective ignorance interpretation, thereby anticipating
the strategy of the decoherence approach. Decoherence theories finally argue
that the system (plus apparatus) is left in the “appropriate” mixture due to the
ubiquitous interactions between the device and its environment. Home stresses
that it is our lacking an explanation of the transition from the pure to the
mixed state that constitutes the measurement problem, and that reference to
the practical impossibility, due to decoherence, of distinguishing the two types
of description of the postmeasurement situation only constitutes a ‘FAPP’ solu-
tion.3 Neither is a subjectivist, information theoretic account (Home refers to
Heisenberg and Zeilinger) satisfactory, according to which the transition from
the pure compound state to the mixture describes the change of knowledge of
the observers. As Home points out, this view does not do justice to the fact
that the change of knowledge is effected by a change in the real state of affairs
that this knowledge refers to.
Here it is interesting to note that the book contains no explicit discussion of
the two fundamentally different uses of mixed state (‘density’) operators: Home
gives a lucid account (already in Chapter 1) of the use of density operators for
the representation of statistical ensembles; however, the fact that these operators
arise as descriptions of subsystems of compound systems emerges only rather
implicitly at various points throughout the book. It is important to note that
a pure entangled state of a compound system necessarily yields a mixed state
description for each of its subsystems, and that these density operators of the
subsystems do not allow an ignorance interpretation. A formal correlate to this
is that every mixed state has an infinity of possible convex decompositions into
(generally non-orthogonal) pure states, so that there is no a priori preference
of a particular decomposition. These facts about state operators should be an
integral part in the teaching of the quantum formalism; but instead they seem
3‘FAPP’ is a famous acronym for ‘for all practical purposes’, coined by John Bell to char-
acterise pragmatic attempts of dissolving fundamental quantum problems.
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to be little known or noticed even in the expert literature. The readers of this
book should therefore be encouraged to follow up the valuable references (10
and 11 of Chapter 1) given by Home.4 A weakness of the decoherence account
is that it does not recognise the need to address the fundamental nature of this
distinction.
If the standard framework of quantum mechanics is unable to resolve the
measurement problem, it follows that alterations, either of the formalism or
of the interpretation, have to be taken into consideration. The nonstandard
approaches considered at some length by Home are: the many-worlds interpre-
tation, the Bohmian model, and the dynamical models of spontaneous ‘wave
function’ (state vector) collapse. Very clear and valid critical assessments are
given of the merits and difficulties of each of these approaches; in particular,
some of the dynamical collapse models are presented in considerable technical
and quantitative detail, in preparation for the subsequent exploration of possi-
ble experimental discriminations between these models, and the Bohmian model
and the decoherence theoretical accounts.
At this point the reader may wonder whether it would be possible to give a
systematic overview of the different interpretational options. I believe this ques-
tion can be answered in the positive. If the standard rule of associating definite
values with eigenstates is regarded as the root of the measurement problem,
then this would suggest a systematic investigation of possible alternative inter-
pretational rules specifying which quantities can be regarded as having definite
values in relation to a given state. A comprehensive classification of such no-
collapse interpretations has indeed been achieved in the recent book by J. Bub
(1997), on the basis of a seminal paper by Bub and Clifton (1996). This work
allows one to consider early and very different interpretations such as Bohr’s
and von Neumann’s under a common perspective with the Bohmian model, the
many-worlds and other more recent variants such as modal interpretations and
consistent histories accounts. From the point of view of such a general analysis
it becomes clear that the decoherence theory does not constitute a stand-alone
approach to the measurement problem, unless it is supplemented with further
interpretational commitments. In other words, decoherence is a physical phe-
nomenon that plays a crucial part in the physics of macroscopic systems, and as
such it figures in probably all no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics.
On the other hand, if one wishes to hold on to the eigenvalue-eigenstate
rule, the only option left seems to be that of modifying the standard quantum
formalism. There are basically two ways of removing the undesired superpo-
sitions of pointer states (or of more general macroscopically distinct states).
The projection postulate, either in Dirac’s stochastic quantum jump version or
in von Neumann’s collapse form can apparently be realised in two ways only:
4The mathematical feature of the non-unique convex decomposability of any mixed state
was first observed as a general phenomenon by Schro¨dinger who was also fully aware of the
interpretational implications (Schro¨dinger, 1936). A complete characterisation of the possible
decompositions of a non-pure density operator has been given in (Hughston et al, 1993) for
the finite-rank case, and in full generality in (Cassinelli et al, 1997) , based on a fundamental
partial results of (Hadjisavvas, 1981).
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either one modifies the dynamical law of quantum mechanics so that for iso-
lated microsystems the Schro˝dinger equation is valid as a good approximation
while for large systems a stochastic contribution in the generalised dynamical
equations becomes predominant, leading to spontaneous destructions of coher-
ent superpositions; or one makes room for the existence of superselection rules
and the associated classical observables. But since these are known to emerge
naturally only in the context of quantum systems with infinitely many degrees
of freedom, the standard formalism of the Hilbert space quantum mechanics of
finitely many particles would have to be extended to allow a modelling of macro-
scopic objects as infinite systems in an ontic sense. The extended framework
is that of quantum field theory or its abstract version, C∗-algebraic quantum
theory.
Home addresses only very briefly one version of the superselection rules ap-
proach, the many-Hilbert spaces theory. Therefore two supplementary remarks
may be in place. A substantial philosophical assessment of the algebraic theory
of superselection in relation to the quantum measurement problem can be found
in (Landsman, 1995). The C∗-algebraic quantum formalism provides a natural
framework for rigorous studies of decoherence as well as spontaneous dynamical
collapse mechanisms, as indicated in recent work in the context of quantum
filtering theory (Belavkin, 1994; Belavkin and Melsheimer, 1995).
The final topic of Home’s chapter on measurement is a very interesting dis-
cussion of two experimental proposals. The first is a neutron interferometry
experiment potentially capable of discriminating between decoherence effects
and spontaneous wave function collapse models. Suitable variations of param-
eters in the various models show that environment-induced decoherence and
spontaneous collapse lead to quantitatively different predictions regarding the
occurrence or non-occurrence of observable interference effects. In the second,
more tentative and less detailed, proposal, a DNA molecule is considered as a
detection device to probe ultraviolet photon emission from a source. The meso-
scopic nature of such macromolecules suggests that their functioning as quantum
probes does not prevent them from assuming either one of their macroscopically
distinct states rather than persisting in an entangled superposition state with
the photon.
Home points out some quantitative difficulties met by the present decoher-
ence and collapse models in an attempted explanation of such an experiment. In
the case of the Bohm model, Home speculates that the ontological definiteness
of position may allow the conclusion that interference effects of the – possi-
bly overlapping – “wave functions” of the uv-damaged and undamaged DNA
configurations are suppressed (unobservable). This would again demonstrate
that ‘within the Bohmian scheme, ontological position must be ascribed a more
fundamental reality than the wave function’ (p. 132). Home’s main conclusion
drawn from these examples is that experiments of the kind described here may
provide useful hints for further refinements of the nonorthodox approaches.
Yet, while it is true that specific models of decoherence and spontaneous lo-
calisation, say, may lead to distinguishable experimental predictions, it is unclear
whether an interpretation based on dynamical collapse can be experimentally
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discriminated from the no-collapse interpretations. For in the latter it is just
the meaning of the term ‘objective reality’ that has been changed; in fact, any
no-collapse interpretation can adopt some form of stochastic dynamic model
as an effective description of the state of affairs. It is thus an open question
whether a change of interpretation (concept of reality) will suffice for a reso-
lution of the measurement problem, or whether a change of theory (dynamics;
superselection rules) is ultimately needed. At present, every researcher into this
problem must be prepared to make a choice and a long-term commitment to
one of these options and pursue its elaboration, without being able to know
whether this will ultimately lead to its confirmation or refutation. The ques-
tion to be answered by any no-collapse interpretation is whether it affords a
coherent reformulation of the bulk of theoretical results of quantum physics in
its own terms; in particular, it needs to provide a satisfactory account of the
selection of its specific ‘preferred’ observable (Bub, 1997). The central task for
the spontaneous collapse theorist is to go beyond the exploratory stage of ad hoc
models and establish a general axiom of modified quantum dynamics that can
be accepted as compelling and aesthetic as the unitary Schro˝dinger evolution
has always been regarded to be.
The involvement of large objects in quantum measurements connects the
measurement problem with the broader question of the classical limit of quan-
tum mechanics. The nonstandard approaches discussed so far take for granted
the universal validity of quantum mechanics or one of its modifications. Home
refers to Leggett and (‘even’) Feynman as two distinguished authorities who
pointed to the possibility that quantum mechanics could fail for large objects.
The expectation is that before long experimental technology may have advanced
far enough so as to allow us to test this possibility. Hence a good understanding
of the relationships between the quantum and classical descriptions of macro-
scopic systems will be required. This is the subject of Chapter 3.
4 Is there a classical limit of quantum mechan-
ics?
To begin with, I would like to cite another distinguished authority whose life
work constitutes an essentially negative answer to this question. For the briefest
summary of G. Ludwig’s monumental studies of the quantum theory of macrosys-
tems seems to be that quantum mechanics is not easily capable of providing
the objective description appropriate to the behaviour of macrosystems. Lud-
wig concludes that a hierarchy of theories is needed to account for the whole
range of phenomena from the microscopic to the macroscopic realms. In fact,
in his approach the Hilbert space quantum mechanics of microsystems is first
deduced from the objective description of macroscopic devices (Ludwig, 1985).
The view that the extrapolation of quantum mechanics into a many-particle
theory of macrosystems is a more comprehensive theory than the objective de-
scription of macrosystems has, according to Ludwig, ‘generated unsurmountable
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difficulties for explaining the measuring process’. Accordingly, his solution of
the measurement problem is based on the construction of an objective theory
of macrosystems that is more comprehensive than the extrapolated quantum
mechanics (Ludwig, 1987). The compatibility between these two theories is ex-
pressed as the fact that approximate embedding maps between them can be
formulated. Research along the lines of this programme is being pursued by the
Marburg and Milan groups, e.g.,. (Lanz, 1994), (Lanz and Melsheimer, 1993)).
It is reassuring to observe that the general conclusions obtained from such
a comprehensive structural study of the quantum-classical relationship are in
agreement with the implications drawn from the very concrete case studies of
classical limit procedures presented by Home. On reading his Chapter 3 it
becomes evident that there are many strands to the classical limit problem,
including the traditional semiclassical methods (h → 0 limit, large quantum
number limits, Ehrenfest’s theorem) as well as the decoherence models and the
Bohmian approach. In each case it is shown in detailed, explicit examples that
certain classical features of large systems can approximately be described in
terms of quantum mechanics; but it is also made clear that there remains room
for genuine quantum effects in large systems. Thus there is scope for future
experimental tests of this extrapolation of quantum mechanical predictions into
the macroscopic realm. But Home points out that before any definite conclu-
sions can be drawn, many more, and more realistic, case studies will have to be
delivered within each of the approaches discussed.
Despite the unquestionable merit of this chapter as an introductory survey of
the classical limit problem, it is crucial to point out that a whole range of impor-
tant contributions (in addition to Ludwig’s work) is left unnoticed. For example,
the demand for more realistic modelling, including the development of a range
of theoretical tools, had already been met to a significant degree in the case
of the decoherence approach, by a book that appeared almost simultaneously
with the present one: namely, (Giulini et al, 1996), reviewed in (Donald, 1999).
Other contributions are concerned with the structural similarities and differ-
ences between quantum and classical mechanics, as opposed to the quantitative
aspects considered in the present book. An excellent up-to-date exposition of
mathematical aspects of quantisation theory can be found in (Landsman, 1998)
(cf. the forthcoming review by G. Emch in this journal), while (Schroeck, 1996)
(reviewed in (Landsman, 1999)) approaches the quantum-classical relationship
from the point of view of quantum mechanics on phase space.
Home’s analysis of the classical limit is centered on the following three clas-
sicality criteria: (1) the time evolution of a macroscopic system should (approx-
imately) be describable in terms of a classical dynamical law (for its relevant
state variables); (2) a macrosystem should be described as an object that is well
localised at all times; (3) a macro-object can be measured non-invasively, that
is, without affecting the outcomes of subsequent measurements. As regards,
these criteria, one may wonder why only position should be required to have
a definite value. The dynamics of a classical ‘particle’ is deterministic with
respect to position and momentum taken together as the state variables, not
with respect to position alone. Similarly, non-invasive measurability should be
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stipulated to hold for all macroscopic quantities, not position alone. Hence one
is forced to confront the fundamental structural difference between the quan-
tum and classical description of a particle; the question to be asked is: how
can the familiar deterministic phase space description of macroscopic classical
particles be extracted from the quantum mechanical Hilbert space description?
Attempts to resolve this problem have led to a variety of phase space formu-
lations of quantum mechanics, ranging from the Wigner-Weyl formalism and
Husimi distribution to geometric and other phase space quantisation schemes.
Powerful mathematical and theoretical tools for the treatment of foundational
as well as concrete quantum mechanical problems have been developed in these
approaches, leading to valuable structural insights into the problem of quantum-
classical compatibility. Yet, a coherent, generally accepted account of what ex-
actly constitutes the classical limit of quantum mechanics is still lacking; and it
may not be achieved without realistic case studies of macroscopic systems which
make full use of the existing conceptual tools. In particular, such studies should
make explicit the macroscopic nature of the systems, that is they should mani-
festly take into account the large number of degrees of freedom of these systems.
Interesting approaches where ‘macroscopic’ is explicated using the tools of non-
standard analysis (i.e., considering Planck’s constant h as infinitesimal) have
led to a structural transition from quantum to classical descriptions; (Werner
and Wolff, 1995), (Ozawa, 1997).
In summary, to date the question whether Giulini et al or Ludwig is right
– that is the question whether quantum mechanics does or does not suffice
to explain the emergence of a classical world in the macrodomain – must be
regarded as largely open: the starting points of these approaches are so dif-
ferent in their philosophical outlook and ensuing conceptual elaborations that
a confrontation of their contrasting conclusions will require extensive further
investigation. Examples of extensive recent studies complementing the material
of Home’s Chapter 3 are the books of Landsman (1998) and Schroeck (1996)
mentioned above, as well as Stulpe (1997), which provide good starting points
for a systematic treatment of these questions. A very surprising perspective on
quantum mechanics, displaying its striking contrasts with classical mechanics in
a novel way, has been discovered and developed during the 1990s by Beltrametti
and Bugajski (e.g., Beltrametti and Bugajski, 1995), who introduced a classi-
cal extension of quantum mechanics in which quantum states are represented
as mixed classical states and quantum effects are represented as fuzzy classical
effects. This example shows that we should not expect that every possible way
of confronting quantum mechanics with classical ontological ideas such as hid-
den variables has already been explored or even envisaged. The vast “distance”
to be passed in the transition from quantum to the classical (or conversely)
is strikingly illuminated in a philosophical case study of elementary particle
tracks, which coincidentally enhances Ludwig’s position regarding the necessity
of a chain of theories linking the accounts of the microscopic with those of the
macroscopic (Falkenburg, 1996).
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5 Quantum nonlocality, superluminal signals,
and all that
Chapter 4 on ‘Quantum Nonlocality’ provides a careful explanation of what
constitutes a nonlocal effect. Home distinguishes between two types of nonlo-
cality – kinematic and measurement-induced. The former kind is exemplified by
the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and is generically represented
by pairs of spatially separated systems in entangled states. Home reviews the
attempts to provide local realistic accounts of a variety of situations and the en-
suing Bell-type inequalities or relations without inequalities, which are in conflict
with both quantum mechanics as well as in some cases with actual experiments.
Interesting novel points discussed in great detail are the quantum mechani-
cal predictions of violations of local realism even in the macroscopic limit and
an experiment exhibiting nonlocality in single-photon states. Instances of mea-
surement induced nonlocality arise in correlated, spatially separated systems if
the collapse of the state vector is taken as an objective real process occurring
in the individual case: this is nicely demonstrated in a model-independent ex-
ample, thus reinforcing the notion of ‘objectification at a distance’ or ‘passion
at a distance’ (Shimony, 1984). Other intriguing instances of this type of non-
locality involve negative-result measurements and the novel process of quantum
teleportation (which since the publication of the book has been experimentally
realised). Home emphasises that quantum nonlocality does not necessarily in-
volve spacelike separations and thus relativistic considerations. Going somewhat
beyond the scope of the book (nonrelativistic quantum mechanics), a brief dis-
cussion of the problem of spacelike nonlocalities and the ensuing ‘danger’ of
superluminal signalling, and hence violations of relativistic causality, is given.
In this context, the issue of individual state determinations becomes crucial,
which has been raised in various places in the book: the possibility of protec-
tive measurements, and the impossibility of state cloning (pp. 20-23). Home
reviews the proposal that individual state determination would be feasible if it
were possible to measure non-Hermitian operators with their non-orthogonal
systems of eigenstates, and emphasises that this would enable superluminal sig-
nalling using EPR entangled systems. What seems to be lacking in the relevant
literature is any attempt to develop a theory of measurements of such operators.
It seems to me that the only conceivable route to making operational sense of
such proposals is by way of the standard measurement formalism and the en-
suing POVM approach. After all, the non-Hermitian operators in question are
associated with a POVM in the same sense as a standard self-adjoint operator
is associated with its spectral measure. There do exist general results to the
extent that state cloning or other ways of discriminating non-orthogonal states
using measurements involving POVMs are equally doomed to fail as was the
case with standard observables (see, e.g., (Busch, 1997)).
If one enters the domain of relativistic quantum mechanics, the issue of non-
locality assumes an entirely new level of complexity: the definition of a local or
nonlocal phenomenon must be based on a precise concept of localised processes
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or operations; and the known ways of formalising localised states or localisa-
tion observables lead to implications that seem to be in conflict with relativistic
causality. For recent reviews of the conceptual aspects involved, cf. (Butter-
field and Fleming, 1999), and (Busch, 1999). Even the definition of (sharp,
i.e. PVM) position observables for elementary systems is limited to the case of
massive particles or massless particles of spin less than 1. It is only within the
extended set of POVMs that a unified account of relativistic particle localisabil-
ity can be achieved, namely, in terms of covariant phase space observables (e.g.,
(Schroeck, 1996), (Brooke and Schroeck, 1996)). In the current discussions of
nonlocality, the localisation of the measurement operations involved is always
tacitly assumed but apparently there is no attempt to make this assumption
formally explicit. Hence a coherent account of these phenomena in terms of
relativistic quantum theory is still waiting to be carried out. This becomes even
more urgent in view of recent experimental demonstrations of (i) EPR-type non-
locality with entangled photons at distances of more than 10km (Zbinden et al,
2000) and (ii) photons tunnelling through opaque media with “superluminal”
speeds (Cologne, 1998).
6 Complementarity versus Uncertainty?
In Chapter 5, Home discusses ‘Wave particle duality of light and complemen-
tarity’. After a critical review of Bohr’s views and some traditional early for-
malisations of the idea of complementarity, a variety of modern quantum opti-
cal experiments are described, concluding with the provocative suggestion that
complementary wave and particle aspects can coexist, after all, possibly in some
contrast to Bohr’s intuitions. The chapter concludes with a careful examination
of the empty-wave paradox as a difficulty of the Bohm and de Broglie causal
theories. One may wonder whether a radical alternative approach to the whole
issue would be to abandon the “wave” and “particle” terminology, along with
undertaking a fundamental revision of the underlying ontology. It may be noted
that conclusions similar in some sense to Home’s, regarding the coexistence of
information about path observables (“particle” properties?) and interference
observables (“wave” properties?) have been obtained in measurement theoretic
analyses of similar experiments. It is in fact possible to formalise the notion
of a joint approximate measurement of such pairs of ‘complementary’ observ-
ables. The complementarity is then expressed in the reciprocal behaviour of
the degrees of precision available at the same time (see, e.g., (Martens and de
Muynck, 1990a,b), (de Muynck et al, 1991), (Busch et al, 1995)).
The idea of complementarity in quantum mechanics, however vague its de-
scriptions by Bohr may have been regarded, has been a source of inspiration in
the search for appropriate interpretations of quantum mechanics. This is well
exemplified by Home’s Chapter 5. Yet it is rather disturbing to see that vari-
ous strands of important investigations have remained largely unnoticed. There
have been confused debates about the logical relations between complementarity
and uncertainty ‘principles’ ever since the quantum pioneers introduced these
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notions. The style, and the conceptual and formal level of these discussions have
advanced surprisingly little beyond the original works from the 1920s and 1930s.
It is amazing to see that despite this conceptual obscurity, some very fascinat-
ing novel experimental realisations of former Gedanken experiments illustrating
complementarity have been conceived and carried out. One recent example
is an atomic interferometric demonstration of a link between complementarity
and entanglement and of the fact that dynamic disturbances cannot (always) be
made responsible for the destruction of interferences in ‘which path’ experiments
(Du˝rr et al, 1998). The controversy in the journal ‘Nature’ on ‘complementarity
versus uncertainty’ leading up to this experiment (see the references in (Du˝rr
et al, 1998)) could probably have been cut short by taking into account existing
relevant studies on the subject.
To begin with, ‘complementarity’ and ‘uncertainty’ are not (any more) ‘prin-
ciples’ on which the presentation and teaching of quantum mechanics are (to be)
based. They are more appropriately regarded as logical consequences of the for-
malism. As such, their logical relation cannot strictly speaking be investigated
within the Hilbert space framework. Such an analysis requires a more general
theoretical framework in which both ideas can be formulated as contingent pos-
tulates. Only then can the question be asked whether or not one implies the
other, or whether or not they both have some common implications. Answers
can be found in (Lahti, 1980; 1983). Next, uncertainty and complementarity
can be understood as relations (between observables) within standard quan-
tum mechanics; even then there are different possible formalisations. We have
discussed the case of the uncertainty relations in an earlier section. Valuable
studies of quantitative aspects of complementarity and uncertainty relations can
be found in (Lahti, 1987), (Martens and de Muynck, 1990a,b), or (Uffink and
Hilgevoord, 1985).
7 The Quantum Zeno effect and time as an ob-
servable
The last strictly physical chapter of the book deals with the quantum Zeno
effect – the fact that under certain conditions the dynamical evolution of a
quantum system can be inhibited by continuously observing it. For example,
continuous monitoring of an unstable state may have the effect of ‘freezing’ the
evolution altogether. This phenomenon is paradoxical if one ignores the fact
that in quantum mechanics, and contrary to classical physics, measurements
can not be regarded as non-invasive. Home reviews simple models of continuous
observations of decaying systems where the effect depends on deviations from the
exponential decay law in the short time range which are theoretically required
but not yet experimentally exhibited. This is followed by a careful analysis
of the famous ‘quantum telegraph’ experiment of Itano et al, showing that it
demonstrates an interaction-induced – as opposed to measurement-induced –
inhibition of transitions. Home then describes the status of a variety of ingenious
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experimental proposals which can be expected to eventually lead to conclusive
tests of the quantum Zeno effect.
The central practical difficulty is one of making rapid sequences of measure-
ment, with an enormously high degree of temporal resolution, within the order
of the lifetimes of the observed systems. Another, conceptual, issue not raised
is the question as to whether a ‘continuous observation’ is adequately mod-
elled as a rapid sequence of ordinary (von Neumann-Lu˝ders) measurements.
There may be a subtle but fundamental difference between the experimental
approaches toward answering the two questions: ‘Has the system decayed yet
at time tn ∈ {0, t1, . . . , tN = T }?’, and ‘When did the system decay during the
period [0, T ]?’ In the first case the answer will be sought by making a yes-no
measurement of the simple observable {Pψ, I − Pψ}, where Pψ is the projection
onto the unstable initial state of the system. In the latter case the experiment
consists of placing detectors around the system and waiting for its decay prod-
ucts to show up. This addresses the question about the time of the occurrence
of an event, considered as an event time observable. A quantum theory of time
measurements is largely still waiting to be developed, although the POVM ap-
proach has provided some promising modelling, primarily of photon counting
processes in quantum optics. For a review, cf. (Srinivas and Vijayalakshmi,
1981), (Srinivas, 1996). Since the appearance of the present book, questions
such as ‘When does a measurement occur?’, and ‘When does a particle (de-
cay product) pass a certain space region (detector)?’ have become the subject
of renewed intense interest in experimental and theoretical physics, leading to
an increased awareness and appreciation of the deep open conceptual problems
involved (Muga and Leavens, 2000).
8 Causality, reality, objectivity
The last two chapters are devoted to philosophical issues. Chapter 7 presents
a discussion of the possible meanings of causality and its status in classical
and quantum mechanics. An assessment is given of the various different ways
in which the standard interpretation, the Bohmian model and the dynamical
collapse theory attempt to cope with the apparent indeterminism of individual
measurement outcomes. The attitude of the standard approach is characterised
as a resignation to accept acausality at the individual level and to be content
with the validity of causality at the statistical level (of the evolution of prob-
abilities). By contrast, the Bohmian causal theory offers a way of restoring a
manifest causal link between pre- and post-measurement situations – even if at
the expense of having to acknowledge that this causal account is inaccessible
to observation as a matter of principle. The dynamical collapse theories finally
cast the indeterminism of stochastic jumps occurring in any measurement into
the form of a law, thus providing a logical basis for the concept of statisti-
cal causality. The tensions with relativistic causality faced by the latter two
approaches are briefly explained, noting that both of them have their ways of
evading causal paradoxes, either by accepting a preferred frame of reference or
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by careful selection of the collapse dynamics, respectively.
The ro´le of the concept of causality in the complex process of constituting
objective experience is not addressed. Home comes close to such a consider-
ation in the final chapter where he offers a reappraisal of Einstein’s case for
realism. On the basis of a number of carefully selected and well placed quo-
tations from Einstein and his contemporaries, Home describes Einstein’s turn
from his early positivistic preferences to his ultimate advocacy of local, causal
realism. In trying to exhibit Einstein’s motivation for his strict adherence to
locality, Home makes the following key observation (pp. 367-368): ‘Einstein’s
point was not that nonlocal actions are inconceivable but that their existence
undermines physical science. If distant nonlocal influences are permitted, then
unless these are eliminated ..., we cannot trust measurement results to indicate
that a system is in a specific state, possesses specific properties, and so on...
Thus Einstein believed that the locality condition was necessary to ensure the
existence of closed systems and therefore the possibility of testing theories:
if this axiom were to be completely abolished, the idea of the existence of
(quasi) enclosed systems, and thereby the postulation of laws, which can
be checked empirically in the accepted sense would become impossible.
Note that the primary motivation behind Einstein locality is not the rela-
tivistic requirement that no signal may propagate faster than light but rather
a more general consideration related to a fundamental methodological principle
of physical science.’
Home here touches upon an issue that is central to one particular approach
towards reconstructing quantum theory: the Cologne version of ‘quantum logic’.
Quantum logic was initiated by von Neumann and Birkhoff who analysed the
proposition structure entailed by the lattice of subspaces of Hilbert space. Var-
ious researchers considered quantum logic as a revision of classical logic which
allowed one to maintain the value definiteness of propositions without running
into the contradictions that classical logical rules would otherwise lead to. Later
it was realised that the aprioristic structures of logic could be recovered by a
transcendental philosophical argumentation much in the same way as was car-
ried out by Kant for epistemological categories such as substance and causality.
This led to a reconstruction of the quantum language via a reflection on nec-
essary conditions of the accepted form of a scientific language about object -ive
scientific experience. A convenient form for this programme was provided by the
theory of dialogue games (Mittelstaedt, 1978), (Stachow, 1980). Moreover, it
has been possible to exhibit specific features of the quantum mechanical propo-
sition lattice – atomicity and covering law – as consequences of the condition
that this language refers to individual objects (Stachow, 1985).
On the formal side, a central aim of the quantum logics approach was the
derivation of the Hilbert space realisation of the proposition lattice from phys-
ically motivated assumptions. In fact, as is well known, any irreducible ortho-
complemented, orthomodular lattice of chain length greater than 3 can be iden-
tified with a (sublattice of a) lattice of subspaces of some orthomodular vector
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space, in such a way that the associated bilinear form of that space determines
the orthogonality relation. The construction of the isomorphic embedding in
question fixes uniquely the skew field over which the vector space is defined.
It was long believed that the only candidate fields for which this construction
worked are the ‘classical’ fields of the real or complex numbers, or the quater-
nions. However, in 1980, examples of ‘non-classical’ orthomodular vector spaces
were discovered, and the whole quantum logic programme stalled for about 15
years as it was not clear whether a lattice theoretic property could be formu-
lated that would select the ‘classical’ fields. Such a condition was indeed found
in the mid-1990s, leaving still open the problem of a physical motivation. For a
survey of this development, cf. (Holland, 1995).
The idea of deducing quantum structures from conditions of objective experi-
ence suggests a thorough revision of the Kantian programme in order to examine
whether this approach can be appropriately adapted so as to encompass modern
physical theories. Such a project would not only examine the role of properties
such as locality in the constitution of objects but would include all other cate-
gories originally proposed by Kant, including causality. The first steps into this
major philosophical enterprise have been taken within the Cologne group (Mit-
telstaedt, 1986), (Strohmeyer,1987, 1995), but much work remains to be done,
particularly in exhibiting the implications of the philosophical findings for the
interpretation of quantum mechanics. At the present stage, I feel, there is room
to hope that a quantum ontology can be formulated which gives a framework
for a viable alternative to the Bohmian model, namely, in the form of a coherent
‘indeterminacy’, or ‘unsharp reality’, interpretation of quantum mechanics as a
theory of individual objects (Busch et al, 1995), (Mittelstaedt, 1995).
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